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Abstract
This paper explores how the introduction of deep habits in a standard new-Keynesian model
affects the properties of widely used interest rate rules. In particular, an interest rate rule satis-
fying the Taylor principle is no longer a sufficient condition to guarantee determinacy. Including
interest rate smoothing and a response to output deviations from steady state significantly im-
prove the regions of determinacy. However, under all the simple interest rate rules considered
here with contemporaneous variables, determinacy is not guaranteed for very high degree of
deep habits. The intuition behind these findings is tied to how deep habits give rise to counter-
cyclical markups, a property that makes it an appealing feature in the study of demand shocks.
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1 Introduction
Simple interest rate rules have been shown to approximate the actual monetary policy rather
successfully, and are widely used in the literature.1 An interest rate rule where the nominal interest
rate adjusts by more than one-for-one in response to inflation, is often argued to be a necessary and
sufficient requirement to guarantee a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium. This rule is
said to satisfy the Taylor principle, following Woodford (2001).
However, a number of papers have pointed out the limitation of the Taylor principle in avoiding
indeterminacy and fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling fluctuations, when departing from standard
modeling assumptions. This includes among others Benhabib et. al (2001) and Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) who consider different modeling choices for money, Gali et. al (2004) who consider a
model with rule-of-thumb consumers and Sveen and Weinke (2005) who model firm-specific capital.
The conditions for determinacy of a unique equilibrium thus seems to be model-dependent, and so
the robustness of proposed rules to model specification is a concern.
In this paper, I show how introducing deep habits into a model affect the performance of
simple interest rate rules, and assess whether the Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for
determinacy.2 I analyze a standard new Keynesian model economy with capital accumulation, and
in this framework allow for households to exhibit deep habits, which is essentially external habit
formation (or keeping up with the Joneses) on a good-by-good basis. Habit formation is a desirable
feature in macroeconomic models since it helps account for the hump-shaped and persistent response
of consumption to various shocks in the economy. Studying a model with deep habits, as introduced
in Ravn et. al (2006), is of special interest since it is a more generalized version of habit formation,
as agents form habits over consumption of individual goods that form the composite consumption
good. Deep habits give rise to the same consumption Euler equation, but unlike the more widely
used habit formation at the level of a single aggregate good, they have additional consequences
for the supply side of the economy. They render the firm’s pricing problem dynamic and give rise
to time-varying markups of price over marginal cost. The implied countercyclical markups are
consistent with the findings of the empirical literature (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)), and
additionally act as a transmission mechanism for the observed effects of demand shocks, such as
government spending shocks (Ravn et. al (2007) and Zubairy (2009)).
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. In a model with deep habits, if
the monetary authority follows a rule where the nominal interest rate strictly responds to current
inflation, then the Taylor principle is too weak a condition to render stability. Specifically, the
response to inflation required in order to guarantee a determinate equilibrium is increasing in
the degree of deep habit. I also show that including interest rate smoothing and a response to
output deviations from steady state into the monetary policy rule significantly improve the regions
1This is shown in the seminal paper, Taylor (1993) and is also one of the main conclusion of the contributions to
the Taylor (1999) volume.
2In this paper only operational rules, as described in McCallum and Nelson(1999), are considered, where the
nominal interest rate responds to past inflation or expectations of current inflation and output gap.
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of determinacy. However, under all the simple interest rate rule considered here, when nominal
interest rate responds to contemporaneous variables, determinacy is not guaranteed for very high
degrees of deep habits. Lastly, a backward looking rule is considered, where the nominal interest
rate responds to past inflation. This rule is shown, in general, to perform better than interest rate
rules that respond to current inflation, for high value of deep habits.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model with deep habits and
derives the optimality conditions of the households and firms. Section 3 analyzes the conditions
required for the determinacy of a local unique equilibrium under various simple interest rate rules.
Section 4 examines the robustness of these results under a backward-looking interest rate rule and
habit formation at the level of a single aggregate good. And finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
I am considering a model economy that features optimizing households and a continuum of profit
maximizing firms producing intermediate goods. This is a canonical new-Keynesian model with
investment and the only departure is the presence of deep habit formation, or habit formation
at the level of intermediate goods, for public and private consumption goods, as first introduced
in Ravn et. al (2006). As will become apparent in the following section, the existence of deep
habits gives rise to demand functions with pro-cyclical price-elasticity, and therefore time-varying
counter-cyclical markups, even in the absence of any nominal rigidities.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of measure one indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1]. Each household j ∈ [0, 1] derives utility from consumption, xct and disutility from labor
supply, ht and seeks to maximize lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(xct , ht), (1)
where the utility function has the following functional form, U(xc, h) = [
(xc)1−ν(1−h)ν]1−σ−1
1−σ . The
introduction of deep habits means that the agents do not form habits at the level of the aggregate
consumption basket, given here by xct , but at the level of individualized goods. This is then habit
formation for a narrower category of goods. Thus, the variable xct is a composite of habit adjusted
consumption of a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
xct =
[∫ 1
0
(cit − bcsCit−1)1−
1
η di
]1/(1− 1
η
)
, (2)
where sit−1 denotes the stock of habit in consuming good i in period t. In principle, households
could exhibit a different degree of habit formation across the different individualized goods but for
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the sake of tractability, I assume it to be the same across the differentiated goods. The parameter
bc ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of external habit formation, and when bc is zero, the households do
not exhibit deep habit formation. The stock of external habit is assumed to depend on a weighted
average of consumption in all past periods. Habits evolve over time according to the following law
of motion,
sCit = ρ
csCit−1 + (1− ρc)cit. (3)
The parameter ρc ∈ [0, 1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit to
variations in the cross-sectional average level of consumption of variety i. When ρc takes the value
zero, habit is measured by past consumption. For any given level of consumption of xct , purchases of
each individual variety of goods i ∈ [0, 1] in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing total
expenditure,
∫ 1
0 Pitcitdi, subject to the aggregation constraint (2), where Pit denotes the nominal
price of a good of variety i at time t. The optimal level of demand, cit for i ∈ [0, 1] is then given by
cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
xct + b
csCit−1, (4)
where Pt is a nominal price index defined as Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η .
Note that consumption of each variety is decreasing in its relative price, Pit/Pt and increasing
in the level of habit adjusted consumption xct . At the same time, the demand function has a second
price-inelastic component given by bcsCit−1. When there is an increase in aggregate demand, the
price-elastic part gets a higher weight, which implies that price-elasticity is pro-cyclical and since
markup is given by the inverse of the price-elasticity, it is counter-cyclical. Additionally, firms are
forward-looking and internalize that the demand function has a backward looking term. When
they expect high future demand, they have an additional incentive to lower their markups in order
to appeal to a broader customer base and carry it over to the following period.
The household is assumed to own physical capital, kt, which accumulates according to the
following law of motion,
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it, (5)
where it denotes investment by the household and δ denotes the rate of depreciation of physical
capital.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal state-contingent assets.
Specifically, each period t ≥ 0, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal pay-
ment Aht+1 in period t+ 1 at the dollar cost Etrt,t+1A
h
t+1. The variable rt,t+1 denotes a stochastic
nominal discount factor between periods t and t + 1. Households pay real lump-sum taxes in the
amount τt per period, and each period receive a labor income wtht and income from renting out
capital given by rkt kt.
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The household’s period-by-period budget constraint is then given by,
Etrt,t+1a
h
t+1 +
(∫ 1
0
Pit
Pt
citdi
)
+ ωt + it + τt =
aht
pit
+ rkt kt + wtht + φt, (6)
where ωt = bc
∫ 1
0 Pits
C
it−1/Ptdi. The variable a
h
t /pit denotes the real payoff in period t of nominal
state-contingent assets purchased in period t− 1. The variable φt denotes dividends received from
the ownership of firms and pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of consumer-price inflation.
The household chooses sequences for xct , ht, a
h
t+1, kt+1, it so as to maximize the utility func-
tion (1) subject to (5) and (6), and a no-Ponzi game constraint.
The first-order conditions from the optimizing household’s problem with respect to xct , a
h
t+1, ht
and kt+1 in that order, are given by
Ux(xct , ht) = λt, (7)
λtrt,t+1 = βλt+1
Pt
Pt+1
, (8)
−Uh(xct , ht) = λtwt, (9)
λtqt = βEtλt+1
[
rkt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)
]
. (10)
2.2 Government
Like households, the government is also assumed to form habits over its consumption of individual
varieties of goods. This can be thought of as households deriving utility from public goods that
is separable from private consumption and leisure, and they exhibit good-by-good habit formation
for these particular goods also. For instance, households care about the provision of individual
public goods, such as trash removal or street lighting, in their own constituency versus others. The
government allocates spending over individual varieties of goods, git, so as to maximize the quantity
of composite good produced with the differentiated varieties of goods according to the relation,
xgt =
[∫ 1
0
(git − bgsGit−1)1−1/η
]1/(1−1/η)
.
The variable sGit denotes the government’s stock of habit in good i and is assumed to evolve as
follows,
sGit = ρ
gsGit−1 + (1− ρg)git. (11)
The government’s problem consists of choosing git, i ∈ [0, 1], so as to maximize xgt subject to the
budget constraint
∫ 1
0 Pitgitdi ≤ Ptgt.The resulting demand function for each differentiated good
i ∈ [0, 1] by the public sector is,
git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
xgt + b
gsGit−1. (12)
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Lump sum taxes are assumed to balance out government spending expenditures each period. Real
government expenditures, denoted by gt are assumed to be exogenous, stochastic and follow the
following univariate first-order autoregressive process,
gˆt = ρ˜ggˆt−1 + ²
g
t , (13)
where gˆt is the log deviation of spending from its steady state.
2.3 Firms
Each variety of final goods is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment. Each firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces output using capital services, kit, and labor services, hit as
factor inputs. The production technology is given by F (kit, hit), where the function F is assumed
to be homogenous of degree one, concave, and strictly increasing in both arguments and has the
following constant returns to scale functional form, F (k, h) = kθh1−θ.
The firm is assumed to satisfy demand at the posted price. Formally,
F (kit, hit) ≥ cit + iit + git. (14)
The objective of the firm is to choose contingent plans for Pit, hit and kit in order to maximize the
present discounted value of dividend payments, given by Et
∑∞
s=0 rt,t+sPt+sφit+s where,
φit =
Pit
Pt
(cit + iit + git)− rkt kit − wthit −
α
2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)2
, (15)
under constraints given by (3), (4), (11), and (12) and iit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
it. Note that sluggish price
adjustment is introduced following Rotemberg (1982), by assuming that the firms incur a quadratic
price adjustment cost for the good it produces. This modeling choice of price stickiness produces
qualitatively similar aggregate dynamics as pricing mechanism based on Calvo (1983).3
The first order conditions with respect to hit, kit, cit, sCit , git, s
G
it , iit and pit are,
mcitF2(kit, hit) = wt, (16)
mcitF1(kit, hit) = rkt , (17)(
Pit
Pt
)
−mcit − ν˜ct + λ˜ct(1− ρc) = 0, (18)(
Pit
Pt
)
−mcit − ν˜gt + λ˜gt (1− ρg) = 0, (19)
qtPtλ˜
c
t = Etqt+1Pt+1(b
cν˜ct+1 + ρ
cλ˜ct+1), (20)
3The presence of deep habits makes the pricing problem dynamic and so additionally accounting for dynamics due
to Calvo-style pricing makes aggregation non-trivial.
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qtPtλ˜
g
t = Etqt+1Pt+1(b
gν˜gt+1 + ρ
gλ˜gt+1), (21)(
Pit
Pt
)
−mcit − ν˜it = 0, (22)
η
(
Pit
Pt
)−η−1 (
ν˜ctx
c
t + ν˜
g
t x
g
t + ν˜
i
tit
)
+ α
Pt
Pit−1
(
Pit
Pit−1
− p˜it
)
− (cit + git + iit) = (23)
αEt
[
qt+1
qt
Pt+1
Pt
Pit+1
Pt
Pt
Pit
(
Pit+1
Pit
− 1
)]
.
Note that because all firms face the same factor prices and since they all have access to the same
production technology with the function F being linearly homogeneous, marginal costs, mcit, are
identical across firms. Also note that combining the first order conditions with respect to cit and
sCit to eliminate λ˜
c
t yields,(
Pit
Pt
)
−mcit − ν˜ct
ρc − 1 = Etrt,t+1pit+1
[
bcν˜ct+1 +
ρc
ρc − 1
{(
Pit+1
Pt+1
)
−mcit+1 − ν˜ct+1
}]
, (24)
and similarly for git and sGit .
2.4 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions yield
∫ 1
0 hitdi = ht,
∫ 1
0 kitdi = kt, and in the final goods market,
F (kt, ht) = ct + gt + it +
α
2
(pit − 1)2. (25)
Also, all firms set identical prices in a symmetric equilibrium.
2.5 Monetary policy rule
The log-linearized monetary policy rule is assumed to have the following form,
Rˆt = αRRˆt−1 + (1− αR) (αpipˆit + αY yˆt) , (26)
where αR ≥ 0, αpi ≥ 0 and αY ≥ 0, and Rˆt, pˆit and yˆt represent nominal interest rate, inflation and
output log deviations from respective steady states.
2.6 Baseline Calibration
The model is calibrated to quarterly frequency. The preference parameter, σ, which is the reciprocal
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is set equal to 1, which implies that the utility function
is separable and logarithmic. The discount factor β, is set at 1.03−1/4, which implies a steady-state
annualized real interest rate of 3 percent. The depreciation rate, δ, is set at 0.025, which implies
an annual rate of depreciation on capital equal to 10 percent. θ is set at 0.3, which corresponds to
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a steady state share of capital income roughly equal to 30%. Goods elasticity of substitution, η is
set at 6, which implies a steady state markup of 20 percent in the absence of deep habits. Also,
the steady state labor is set at 0.3, and the share of government spending in aggregate output is
taken at 0.2.
In the baseline calibration, the price stickiness parameter, α, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004), where they model price stickiness with a Rotemberg price adjustment cost, is set to be 17.5.4
Also, it is assumed that the speed of adjustment of the stock of habit for all kinds of goods is equal,
so ρ = ρc = ρg, and this parameter is calibrated to be 0.9, based on estimates in Ravn et. al (2006)
and Zubairy (2009).5 However, I will be conducting sensitivity analysis for varying degrees of price
stickiness (α) and the rate at which the habit stock accumulates (ρ). For sake of simplicity, deep
habits parameters for household consumption and public consumption goods are restricted to be
the same, so b = bc = bg.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
This section explores the conditions required for the existence of a local unique equilibrium. Of
special interest is the role played by the monetary policy rule given by Equation (26), the degree
of price stickiness and their interaction with the deep habit parameters.
3.1 Local Determinacy
The system of log-linearized equations describing the model can be written as follows,
Etyt+1 = Ayt +Bzt,
zt = Rzt−1 + ²t,
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, and consists of both predetermined and non-predetermined
variables.6 zt is a vector of exogenous variables and ²t is a vector of zero mean, serially uncorrelated
shocks. Both A and R are assumed to be non-singular matrices and all eigenvalues of R lie inside
the unit circle, so that zt is covariance stationary.7 Note that the entries of the coefficient matrices
are typically functions of the underlying deep parameters of the model. The goal here is to derive
the parameter restrictions that render a unique equilibrium for the model.
The existence and uniqueness of a local equilibrium in this case depends on the number of
4This value of the price stickiness parameter implies that firms change their price on average every 3 quarters in
a Calvo-Yun staggered-price setting model, based on estimates of a linear new-Keynesian Phillips curve by Sbordone
(2002). Refer to a more detailed discussion in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).
5Ravn et. al(2006) assume ρ = ρc = ρg, and estimate it be 0.85. Zubairy (2009) allows different values for ρc and
ρg and estimates them to be 0.89 and 0.98, respectively.
6The perfect foresight version of this model will consist of only the first equation, and this model has the additional
second equation because of the exogenous process given for government spending in Equation (13).
7The eigenvalue of R here corresponds to the autocorrelation parameter for the exogenous process for public
spending in the model, ρ˜g, which is calibrated to be 0.85, based on estimates in the literature.
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Figure 1: Region of determinacy in the baseline model for various values of the speed of adjustment of the habit
stock (ρ), and a monetary policy rule with strict inflation targeting with αpi = 1.5 and αR = αY = 0.
eigenvalues of matrix A which lie within the unit circle. For determinacy, it is required that number
of stable (i.e. lying within the unit circle) eigenvalues of A equal the number of predetermined
variables. Alternatively, if the number of stable eigenvalues exceeds the number of predetermined
variables then for different initial conditions on the predetermined variables, there exist a continuum
of equilibrium paths that converge to steady state, and a possibility of sunspot fluctuations arise.
On the other hand if the number of stable eigenvalues is less than the number of predetermined
variables, then no local equilibrium exists.
In the analysis that follows, I characterize regions of determinacy by searching over the pa-
rameter space and numerically computing the eigenvalues of A and checking for the number of
eigenvalues that are within the unit circle.
3.2 Deep Habits and Indeterminacy
The main objective of this paper is to understand how the presence of deep habits affects the
determinacy property of the model. As shown in Woodford (2001), in the case of a simple new-
Keynesian model, if we restrict attention to monetary policy rules with αpi, αY > 0, the necessary
and sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of a local unique equilibrium is given by,
αpi +
1 + β
κ
αY > 1,
and is said to satisfy the Taylor principle.8 When there is a zero coefficient on output deviations
from steady state, namely αY = 0, then αpi > 1, satisfies the Taylor principle. Such a rule
guarantees that in response to a change in inflation, the nominal interest rate adjusts more than
one for one.
8Here κ is the coefficient on the output gap in the Phillips curve in the standard new-Keynesian model.
9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
deep habit parameter (b)
in
fla
tio
n 
co
ef
fic
en
t (α
pi
 
)
Figure 2: Region of determinacy under baseline calibration and a strict inflation targeting monetary rule with
αR = αY = 0.
In order to isolate the effects of deep habits, I first consider the conditions for a determinate
equilibrium as a function of the degree of price stickiness, given by α, and the degree of deep habit
formation, given by the parameter b, under a monetary policy rule with strict inflation targeting.9
Figure 1 shows what the determinacy region looks like in our baseline model with the price stickiness
parameter, α increasing along the y-axis, the deep habit parameter, b along the x-axis and under
the assumption αpi = 1.5 and αR = αY = 0. Four different cases are shown with varying values of
ρ, the speed of adjustment of the habit stock. Looking at the figure it is clear that when there are
no deep habits in the model, i.e. b = 0, a unique local equilibrium exists. However, the degree of
deep habits plays a crucial role and for a combination of high values of the deep habit parameter
and high degree of price stickiness, the economy runs into a region of indeterminacy even when
nominal interest rate is adjusting more than one-for-one with inflation. Note in the right most
lower panel, that even in the case of no price rigidities, for the case of ρ = 0.9, multiple equilibria
exist in the case of high degree of deep habits.
Thus, it is clear that the Taylor principle is no longer a sufficient condition to ensure the
existence of a local unique equilibrium in the case of strong nominal rigidities and high degree of
deep habit formation.
3.3 Monetary Policy Rules and Indeterminacy
In order to characterize conditions on monetary policy rule coefficients, required to ensure the
existence of a unique equilibrium, I follow by formally analyzing variation in these coefficients.
In Figure 1, the existence of a determinate equilibrium for the baseline model was considered
under the case of αpi = 1.5. Now, I expand the analysis to consider a broader range of values for
9This implies a monetary policy rule of the form Rˆt = αpipˆit, and so αR = αY = 0.
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Figure 3: Regions of determinacy under baseline calibration, and αY = 0.
the inflation coefficient in the monetary policy rule. Figure 2 shows the determinacy region as I
vary the deep habit parameter along with the inflation coefficient under a strict inflation targeting
rule in our baseline model. All other parameters are calibrated at their baseline values.
It is apparent in Figure 2 that for the case of no deep habit formation, b = 0, or low values
of the deep habit parameter, a unique equilibrium is guaranteed for αpi > 1, but this is not the
case for high degree of deep habit formation. Thus the next question that arises is if the region of
determinacy can be improved upon by modifying the monetary policy rule. So far, only the case
of strict inflation targeting has been considered, where αR = αY = 0 in the monetary policy rule.
Next, different values for these parameters are considered.
First the role of interest rate smoothing is studied. The size of the region of indeterminacy
shrinks gradually as αR is increased, as shown in Figure 3. This suggests that inertial rules are
more desirable in order to render macroeconomic stability.
Next, nominal interest rate is allowed to respond to deviations of output from steady state,
and once again increasing αY improves the region of determinacy. While there is a significant
improvement between the case of no response to output deviations (αY = 0) and the case of
αY = 0.5, the region of determinate equilibria are not affected much by considering αY = 1 relative
to αY = 0.5. So, a response of nominal interest rate to economic activity is also a desirable feature
for an interest rate rule to lead to determinacy.
Here the values considered for αR and αY are based on estimates by Clarida et. al (2000) and
Orphanides (2001). The finding that combining active monetary policy with interest rate smooth-
ing and responsiveness of nominal interest rate to economic activity improves the determinacy
properties of the model is a common across significantly different models.10 Note, however, that
10Among others, Gali et. al (2004) and Sveen and Weinke (2005). Sveen and Weinke (2005) have output gap
in the policy rule, which is the difference between output and its natural level (level of output absent any nominal
rigidities).
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Figure 4: Regions of determinacy under baseline calibration, and αR = 0.
allowing for interest rate smoothing and/or response to economic activity still gives us indetermi-
nacy for very large degrees of deep habits. The estimates for deep habit parameter in the context
of medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium models as well as simpler frameworks similar to the
one considered here, are usually between 0.6 and 0.9.11 The equilibrium is determinate for these
values of the deep habit parameter under some of the calibrations for αR and αY considered here.
3.4 Indeterminacy and Impulse Response Analysis
The analysis above clearly suggests that for very high degree of deep habits, a unique equilibrium
converging to a steady state does not exist for the different interest rate rules studied here. To get
further insight into this finding, let us consider the baseline model and assume that in the monetary
policy rule the nominal interest rate only responds to current inflation. I consider the case where
there are no adjustment costs for prices, so α = 0, since in this case, the dimension of indeterminacy
is 1.12 Once price stickiness is incorporated in the model, the region of indeterminacy where the
Taylor principle is satisfied, has a dimension of indeterminacy being 2. Thus, it is not possible to
get the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a sunspot shock, as shown in Gali(1997).
Suppose households anticipate an increase in aggregate demand, without any shocks to fun-
damentals to justify it. This increase in demand would be accompanied by an increase in hours
worked, lower markups due to deep habits, and high inflation as the firms adjust prices to get to
their wanted markups. But an interest rate rule that has αpi > 1, will generate high real interest
rate along the adjustment path and imply lower consumption and investment relative to steady
state. Thus it would not be possible to sustain a boom in demand, and so it is not consistent with
rational expectations.
11See Ravn et. al (2006) and Zubairy (2009)
12Dimension of indeterminacy is 1 if there is one more stable eigenvalue than the number of predetermined variables.
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Figure 5: Response to a sunspot shock, where b = 0.96 and the monetary policy rule is given by Rˆt = 1.5pˆit.
On the other hand, consider the case where the degree of deep habits is sufficiently high to allow
multiple equilibria. The impulse response functions for such an expansionary sunspot shock are
shown in Figure 5. Here the model is calibrated so the Taylor principle is satisfied, αpi = 1.5, and
the deep habit parameter, b = 0.96. Now even if the interest rate rule follows the Taylor principle,
the higher degree of deep habits will drive the markups countercyclical to a greater extent. This
high deep habit formation helps in driving the markup sufficiently down so it ultimately leads
to a rise in real wages. The increase in wages causes the households to substitute away from
leisure to consumption, and so consumption of households rises. In other words, in such a case the
degree of deep habit formation leads to intra-temporal substitution effects which are larger than the
intertemporal substitution effects. This in turn will lead to a realization of an increase in demand,
as anticipated by agents in the economy, and thus give rise to self-fulfilling expectations.
4 Robustness Analysis
4.1 Backward Looking Interest Rate Rule
In this section, a backward looking monetary rule is considered, where the nominal interest rate
responds to past inflation. The motivation behind adopting this rule is related to the information
available to the monetary authority at any given time. Backward looking rules have also been
recommended in the literature by many others, for instance, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and
Benhabib et. al (2001).13 The rule considered has the following form,
Rˆt = αpipˆit−1.
13Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) show however, that to guarantee global stability, the interest rate
responding to past inflation is not sufficient, and the interest rate should also be set as a function of past interest
rate.
13
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Figure 6: Region of determinacy under baseline calibration and a backward looking monetary policy rule of the form
Rˆt = αpipˆit−1.
Figure 6 shows the region of determinacy when the deep habit parameter, b is varied along with
the inflation coefficient, αpi, in the backward looking rule, in a model where all other parameters
are set at their baseline values. In this case, the equilibrium is unique for higher degree of deep
habits, however for lower values of b, there is determinacy in the case where the monetary policy
actively responds to past inflation so αpi > 1, but no too actively, so that αpi that guarantees a
unique local equilibrium is bounded above. Notice, that this exercise is analogous to Figure 2
except that in Figure 6 the interest rate responds to past inflation instead of current inflation. Just
by comparison of the two figures, under a backward looking rule, the equilibrium is determinate
for higher degrees of deep habits, and unlike the case where nominal interest rate responds to
current inflation, it is not always determinate for lower values of the deep habit parameter, b. This
happens because when nominal interest rate responds to past inflation, it is predetermined in any
given period. Therefore, now in the region where there was determinacy with a contemporaneous
rule, the number of predetermined variables exceeds the number of eigenvalues within the unit circle
by one, and thus there is no local equilibrium in that parameter space. There are still, however,
multiple equilibria for very high degree of deep habit when αpi is greater than but close to 1.
4.2 Habit Formation Over a Single Aggregate Good
The main question addressed in this paper is how introducing deep habits into a new-Keynesian
model affects the determinacy properties of the model. This section shows that the results shown in
Figure 2 are driven by deep habit formation and how it affects the supply side of the economy, and
similar results do not hold for habit formation at the level of the a single aggregate good, which only
affects the demand side. In particular, when habits are formed over the composite consumption
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Figure 7: Region of determinacy in a model with nominal rigidities and superficial habits, and a strict inflation
targeting monetary rule with αR = αY = 0.
good, each household maximizes its utility function,
U(ct, ht) =
[
(ct − θc˜t−1)1−ν (1− h)ν
]1−σ − 1
1− σ ,
where ct =
[∫ 1
0 c
1− 1
η
it
] 1
1− 1η . The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of external habit for-
mation, and c˜t−1 is the average consumption last period. The demand function for good i for a
household in this case is given by,
cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
ct.
This specification of external habit formation is the same as commonly found in the literature, e.g.
in Smets and Wouters (2007), in order to match the persistence in the consumption response to
macroeconomic shocks.
Figure 7 shows the region of determinacy for superficial habits in a model with monopolistically
competitive product markets, nominal rigidities and a strict inflation targeting monetary policy
rule. All parameters are calibrated at their baseline values. Note that the Taylor principle is a
necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee determinacy in this framework. The indeterminacy
region in Figure 2, is therefore precisely due to how deep habits affect the firm’s problem and give
rise to countercyclical markups.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows how introducing deep habits into a model affects the performance of simple
interest rate rules, where the nominal interest rate responds to inflation, output or is subject to
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interest-rate smoothing. The results suggest that the Taylor principle is too weak a condition to
guarantee stability. In this standard new-Keynesian model with deep habits, including interest
rate smoothing and a response to output deviations from steady state into the interest rate rule
significantly improve the regions of determinacy. But, under all these rules, the equilibrium is not
uniquely determined for very high degree of deep habits.
The main intuition behind this finding is that at very high degrees of deep habits, the markups
generated are extremely large and countercyclical with resulting effects on wages that counter
otherwise stabilizing effects of changes in real interest rate due to the monetary policy rule.
It is also shown that a backward looking rule, where nominal interest rate responds to past
inflation, in general, performs better and results in a unique local equilibrium for high values of the
deep habits parameter b, where the monetary rules responding to contemporaneous variables fail
to render determinacy.
To put these findings in perspective, inflation targeting alone does not give us determinacy
in a model with deep habits. The interest rate rules are not evaluated based on welfare, but
if the objective is to avoid indeterminacy, then the interest rate rules that improve the region
of determinacy include interest rate smoothing and/or a response to output. This paper adds
to the literature that suggests that the recommendations for monetary rules that render unique
equilibrium are model dependent. It is then important to be more careful and aware of these
problems of indeterminacy when augmenting models with new features.
The introduction of deep habits is an increasingly important new feature. It generalizes the
concept of habit persistence so that habits are formed over consumption of individual goods instead
of at the level of aggregate consumption. While deep habits affect the demand side exactly like
the standard habit formation, they have additional important consequences for the supply side of
the economy, giving rise to counter-cyclical markups, in line with the existing empirical literature.
Deep habits with their implied strong counter-cyclical movements of markups have been shown
to successfully explain the rise in wages and consumption in response to a government spending
shock, an empirical observation that most standard model fail to predict (see Ravn et. al (2007)
or Zubairy (2009)).
In this paper, monetary policy rules are evaluated on the basis of guaranteeing uniqueness of
equilibrium when deep habits are introduced. Therefore, no recommendations for a policy rule
are made from a welfare point of view.14 An interesting next step would be to use second order
approximation to find optimal monetary policy in a model with deep habits.
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